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COMMENTS
CONDITIONAL SALES-LEGISLATION IN THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON-RECENT LEGISLATION, PARTICU-
LARLY WHERE PERSONALTY IS ATTACHED
TO BUILDINGS ON REALTY
It is a well recognized principle of the common law that as
between the vendor and vendee in a transaction involving property,
they may by agreement fix the incidents which shall attach.1 The
law is replete, however, with cases where a party in possession
using the property creates a more or less deceptive appearance
'In the case of fixtures, see 34 MIcH. LAw REVIEW 427, and n. 3; 83 U.
of PA. L. REv. 916, n. 4, four cases cited.
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as to the ownership of the property so far as third parties are
concerned. As between the vendor and a third party who has
been misled, the law has taken into consideration not merely the
objective incidents such as use and possession, but in addition the
balance of social, particularly business, convenience to vendors
and third parties generally. Sometimes the third party is pro-
tected; sometimes the vendor. In the case of the conditional sale,
the vendor was with few exceptions protected at common law, the
rationalizations of estoppel, apparent ownership, and constructive
fraud being urged in vain. With the intention of protecting both
the vendor and the third party so far as possible, resort was made
to recording and filing acts for the purpose of giving knowledge
to third parties. These acts qualified the rights of the vendor
unless so recorded or filed. While such acts have been adopted
in most of the states, there is still some question as to the policy
of requiring filing or recording due to the fact that they place a
restraint upon merchandising because of the consequent reflection
on the credit of the vendee and the additional costs involved, and
possibly the further fact that the reliance by third parties is
largely fictional rather than real. Accordingly a number of the
states still protect the vendor without the necessity of recording
or filing.
The first act passed in the state of Washington in 18932 was
quite typical of the usual statute except that the conditional sale
was made absolute to all creditors or purchasers in good faith,
and the further provision that the conditional sale was to be
recorded, the auditor to charge the same rates as were allowed for
recording deeds of real property.
The second act, passed in 1903, 8 amended the former act by
protecting the additional class of encumbrancers and limited pro-
tection to subsequent creditors rather than all creditors. Further
the auditor was required to merely file the instrument, keeping
an alphabetical index, and was to charge the sum of twenty-five
cents for each instrument. The first provision of this amendment
is in accord with the usual statutes as to the parties protected and
the effect of the second provision, in requiring only filing, made
possible a nominal cost.
The next act, passed in 1915, 4 again amended the provision as
to parties protected by protecting subsequent creditors, 'whether
or not such creditors have or claim a lien upon such property.
Prior to this legislation the Washington Court had held that a chat-
tel mortgage was valid as to creditors other than those who had ac-
quired some form of lien upon the mortgage property, whether
the mortgage was properly recorded or not.' It had also held that
an unrecorded mortgage might, after the ten-day period provided
by the statute, be recorded and become effective after the date of
such recording as to all creditors both prior and subsequent,
except such creditors as may have acquired a lien prior to the
2Laws of Washington 1893, Chap. 106.3Laws of Washington 1903, Chap. 6.
'Statutes of Washington 1915, Chap. 95.5Heal v. Evans Creek Coal and Coke Company, 71 Wash. 225, 128 Pao.
211 (1912).
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filing.' Following the adoption of this statute, the same amend-
ment being made both with respect to conditional sales and chattel
mortgages, Justice Mackintosh in Clark v. IKilian made the fol-
lowing statement: "In view of these decisions, and with the
obvious purpose of changing the rule they announced, the legis-
lature, in 1915, passed the act which provides that a chattel mort-
gage not filed within ten days from the time of its execution is
void 'as against all creditors of the mortgagor, both existing and
subsequent, whether or not they have or claim a lien upon such
property, and against all subsequent purchasers, pledgees, and
mortgagees and incumbrancers for value in good faith . . .' Under
this statute, a chattel mortgage not recorded within the time is
void as to all the persons mentioned, and as to them is of no effect,
even though it may be filed subsequently to the ten-day period.
The belated filing may carry actual notice to subsequent purchas-
ers, pledgees, mortgagees and incumbrancers for value so as to
take them out of the protection of the 'good faith' clause of the
statute. As we have held in Othello State Bank v. Case Threshing
Machine Co.8 citing several decisions of this court, 'good faith'
includes 'without notice.' " While this decision was made in the
case of the chattel mortgage, the similarity of the provisions and
purposes of the amendments would undoubtedly warrant the
same construction in the case of a conditional sale.
The next act passed was in the extraordinary session of 1925,'
which provided that in case a vendor in a conditional sales contract
assigned the contract to secure a debt or obligation, the assignee
should have the right to enforce all the vendor's remedies under
the contract and if the contract and/or assignment was filed, the
assignee should have a lien upon the property as against the
vendor and his creditors and subsequent purchasers and encum-
brancers, which lien might be enforced as a chattel mortgage is
enforced. It is to be observed that this act was limited to assign-
ments for the security of a debt or other obligation by the vendor
and accordingly did not authorize the filing of an absolute as-
signment."0 This act was in turn amended in 1937,11 first by
providing that if the assignment by the vendor was to secure a
debt or other obligation, it made no difference whether the assign-
ment was or was not absolute upon its face. Further, that the
assignee could enforce all the vendor's remedies under the con-
tract and would have the lien upon the property covered as
against the vendor and any subsequent assignee thereof, the credi-
tors and subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers of either,
which lien could be enforced as a chattel mortgage and that no
filing of said assignment was necessary. Still further, it provided
6Pacific Coast Biscuit Company v. Perry, 77 Wash. 352, 137 Pac. 483
(1914); Watson v. First National Bank, 82 Wash. 65, 143 Pac. 451 (1914);
Keyes v. Sabin, 101 Wash. 618, 172 Pac. 835 (1918).
'Clark v. Kilian, 116 Wash. 532, 533, 534, 199 Pac. 721 (1921).
'Othello State Bank v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 113 Wash. 680,
194 Pac. 563 (1921).
'Laws of Washington 1925, Chap. 120.
"OFlynn v. Garford Motor Company, 149 Wash. 264, 270 Pac. 806 (1928).
"Laws of Washington 1937, Chap. 196, § 2.
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that the assignee would not have to take dominion and control
over the contract or the proceeds thereof and that he did not have
to contract to prevent the mingling by the assignor of the pro-
ceeds thereof amongst his funds or placement of the same in his
bank account. These provisions are self-explanatory. In general,
it perhaps should be noted that the first assignee of such a contract
secures his rights regardless of filing and prevails over a subse-
quent assignee, thus settling a controverted question among the
different jurisdictions.
The major changes, however, in the amendments to the Wash-
ington Conditional Sales Act were made through the enactments
made by our legislature in the sessions of 1933 and 1937.12 The
session laws of 1933 amended section 3790 of Remington's Com-
piled Statutes by the addition of the following provision:
"Every such contract for the conditional sale or lease
of any personal property, except machinery, apparatus
or equipment to be used for manufacturing or industrial
purposes, attached or to be attached to a building, whether
a fixture at common law or not, shall be absolute as to
all subsequent bona fide purchasers or encumbrancers
of such building and the land on which it stands, unless
such contract or lease shall also contain a sufficient legal
description of the real estate which said building occu-
pies, and shall be filed and recorded as provided in section
2 of this act."
Section 37911s of Remington's Compiled Statutes was also
amended by providing for the record of the instrument mentioned
in the preceding provision. The section reads:
"In the case of an instrument for the conditional sale
or lease of personal property, except machinery, appa-
ratus or equipment to be used for manufacturing or in-
dustrial purposes, attached or to be attached to a building,
such instrument shall, in addition to filing and indexing
as herein provided, be indexed and recorded in the record
of mortgages in the auditor's office in the county wherein
the land which said building occupies is situated; and the
fees for indexing and recording shall be the same as for
real estate mortgages."
In the session of 1937,14 section 3790 of Remington's Revised
Statutes was still further amended by a rather exceptional provi-
sion which reads as follows:
"Provided, however, that nothing in this section con-
tained shall be construed to require such filing or record-
ing of any conditional right to purchase, wherein the total
designated unpaid purchase price does not exceed the sum
of fifty dollars ($50) and such contracts or leases shall
be valid as to all bona fide purchasers, pledgees, mort-
gagees, encumbrancers and subsequent creditors: Pro-
"2Laws of Washington 1933, Chap. 129, and Laws of Washington 1937,
Chap. 196.
"Section 2 of the foregoing act.
"'See note 11, supra.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
vided, further, that in computing said 'total designated
unpaid purchase price' there shall be added to said pur-
chase price designated in any such contract the designated
unpaid purchase price set forth in any other contract of
conditional sale executed between the same vendor and
vendee as a part of the same transaction and if the total
of all exceeds said sum of fifty dollars ($50) each of said
contracts of conditional sale shall be absolute as herein-
above provided unless filed or filed and recorded as herein-
above provided."
The last amendment, exempting conditional sales from filing
where the amount involved is not over fifty dollars ($50), will be
first considered. Its policy is obvious. The small amount involved,
the consequent relative higher cost of filing, and the fictitious
reliance of third parties, underlie a policy that the burdens inci-
dent to filing do not warrant filing in order to protect the rights
of the third party. An examination of the statutes, however,
shows there to be little precedent in this country for such a
limitation. An earlier recording statute in Maine applied only
where the agreement was made on a promissory note for more
than thirty dollars ($30), which was superseded by a general filing
statute.15 In the District of Columbia, the provision for filing
applies only where the purchase price exceeds $100.00.16 The Idaho
Code1 ' provides that its enactment with respect to conditional sales
contracts shall not apply to a conditional sale of "household goods
and furniture, musical instruments, motor vehicles, farm imple-
ments and machinery, property exempt from attachment or ex-
ecution, nor to any conditional sale where the consideration is less
than $100.00." It may be observed in passing that a number of
jurisdictions make similar exceptions in the ease of household
goods, as provided in the Idaho Statute. 8 Such limitations ex-
press obvious policies.
Further it may be noted that the fifty dollar ($50) exception
is made to and expressly qualifies the entire section of Remington
3790, making no distinction as to whether personalty is attached
or not to be attached to buildings on the realty. It is hardly
reasonable, however, to presume that our courts will hold that if
personalty becomes so identified with the realty as to become a
part thereof and is not severable except with material injury to
the freehold, that the conditional sales vendor will be protected.
The common law view was that where goods are so closely affixed
as to be swallowed up in the realty, they have no longer any need
for existence separate from the land. 9 The Uniform Conditional
Sales Act is to the same effect.20 It is unfortunate in this respect
that our amendment, in stating that such conditional sales need
"Chap. 32, Laws of 1895.
11929 Code of the District of Columbia, Title 25, § 179.
"General Laws of Idaho 1932, § 62-805.
"Connecticut Public Acts 1895, Chap. 212; New Hampshire Public
Statutes 1901, Chap. 140; New York, Abolished by Laws 1905, Chap. 503.
' Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, 1924, 2a U.L.A. 66 cases
cited.
'
0Section 7, Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
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not be filed, should have added the clause that they were valid.
If the act be literally construed, this will lead to the absurd result
that personalty attached to realty, although identified with the
realty and not severable except with material injury to the free-
hold, may be claimed by the vendor under a conditional sales
contract without even filing, as against subsequent purchasers and
encumbrancers of the realty. It is submitted that the act should
be amended in this respect either by striking the clause giving
validity or by making an exception when personalty is so attached
to realty.
This suggests finally the consideration of the provision in the
amendment of 1933 which provides for recording "a conditional
sale or lease of any personal property except machinery, apparatus,
or equipment to be used .for manufacturing or industrial purposes,
attached or to be attached to a building whether a fixture at
common law or not." This is not an attempt to solve a new prob-
lem, but rather one of a number of attempts to solve by recorda-
tion the problem raised when-a lien is placed on personalty at-
tached to or to become identified with realty. This was at common
law usually determined by finding whether or not the personalty
had become a fixture, the weight of authority being to the effect
that if found to be a fixture, the third party purchaser or encum-
brancer would be protected.2' The difficulty in the application of
such a rationalization is in the determination of the question
whether the personalty has become a fixture. The test usually
suggested to furnish the safest criterion of a fixture is: (1) Actual
annexation to the realty or something appurtenant thereto; (2)
Appropriation to the use or purpose of the realty with which it
is connected; and (3) The intention of the parties making the
annexation to make the article a permanent accession to the free-
hold-this intention being inferred from the nature of the article
affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the an-
nexation, the structure and mode of annexation, and the purpose
or use for which the annexation has been made.2
One writer, in commenting on this test, says that "in its essence,
this doctrine may be succinctly propounded in this form: Did
the person who annexed the disputed chattel intend to make a
permanent annexation to the freehold? The intention is to be
sought not subjectively, but objectively, judged in the light of the
surrounding circumstances and with particular reference to the
mode of annexation and the extent to which the chattel is ap-
propriate to the purpose or use to that part of the realty to which
it is attached."12 It would seem clear that so far as third parties
are concerned, the objectively expressed intention should be the
determinative test. Particularly is this true as it permits flex-
ibility.
One of the chief reasons for the confusion in the law of fixtures
"TnAiFy REAL PRPERTY, second edition, § 271, p. 922 and cases cited
nI. 4.
=Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 530 (1851), a leading case, and see
an excellent discussion in 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 66.
-4 BRooxLmYN L. Rv. 193.
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today is the blind adherence of the courts to the doctrine of stare
decisis. Having once decided that a certain chattel was not a
fixture, it certainly did not follow that it might not be a fixture
when attached under different circumstances, particularly where
a change in custom and usage. There may be need for legislative
guidance in order to release the courts from the bonds of stare
decisis.2"
Washington has from an early time apparently adopted the
objective test of intention -. 2  Emphasis, however, is made on the
mode and sufficiency of annexation, and it is stated that personal
property is generally considered not a fixture if the annexation
is such that it can be removed without material injury to the
realty.26 As between the seller and the buyer of chattels which
are subsequently annexed to realty by the latter, the fact that they
are sold on a conditional sale contract was usually regarded as
equivalent to an agreement that the articles should after annexa-
tion retain their character as personalty.27 Such an agreement was
recognized as effective as between the parties thereto unless the
mode of annexation was such as to wholly deprive the articles of
the attributes of personal property. It would seem then that third
parties, purchasers or encumbrancers, with notice would acquire
only the rights of the conditional sale vendee. Without notice
most courts held the third party encumbrancer or purchaser was
protected on the theory that the seller consented at least impliedly
to the annexation, thus justifying an inference by the purchaser
or mortgagee that the articles were permanent improvements. A
few jurisdictions, including New York, prior to its adoption of the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, protected the seller on the basis
that the buyer could convey no greater interest than he himself
had in the articles.21 It does not appear that this question has
been squarely presented to our Supreme Court. In Boeringa v.
Perry29 the court suggests by implicatiofi at least that the third
party would be protected, although in the instant decision it was
held that pipe embedded in real estate could be removed without
permanent (material) injury to the real estate and the chattel
mortgagee was protected." It is, of course, assumed that if the
personalty has not become a fixture, the third person, purchaser
or encumbrancer, of the real estate will not be protected.
Assuming that the personalty has become a fixture, the question
arises as to how far filing or recording acts may assist the vendor
and protect third parties. In this respect again, there is the
greatest diversity of judicial opinion as to the effect of filing or
recording a chattel mortgage or conditional sale contract covering
a fixture. With the exception of those states in which the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act or statutes of a similar nature are in force,
2'Massachusetts Laws 1927, Chap. 260.
"SWashington National Bank v. Smith, 15 Wash. 160, 45 Pac. 736 (1896).
21See German Savings and Loan Society v. Weber, 16 Wash. 95, 47 Pac.
224 (1896), which is the first of a long line of cases.
210 MINx. L. Rzv. 348.
Godard v. Gould, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 662, 666 (1853).
2196 Wash. 57, 164 Pac. 773 (1917).
OFor cases in the different jurisdictions, see 13 A.L.R. 448.
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the weight of authority appears to favor the view that filing or
recording as personalty is not constructive notice to subsequent
mortgagees or purchasers of the realty to which the fixture is an-
nexed.31 The reason assigned is that the third party encum-
brancers or purchasers should not be expected to search records
relating to personal property on the basis that instruments relating
to real estate should appear in real estate records. A number of
courts, however, treat the filing or recording of personalty as
constructive notice on the basis that it is not too much of a burden
for the third party buyer or encumbrancer to search the chattel
mortgage or conditional sales records. This question, of course,
is purely a matter of policy.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act (Section 7) patterned after
statutes existing in Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Penn-
sylvania prior to the drafting of the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act, protects such parties by requiring conditional sales of per-
sonalty annexed to real estate to be recorded or filed in the real
estate records in order to give notice to purchasers or encum-
brancers of real estate. Such legislation seems desirable although
the states adopting the Uniform Conditional Sales Act still seem
to have difficulty in determining its application. Both Pennsyl-
vania and New York have repeatedly amended the Uniform Act
in this respect.3 2 The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Section 7,
provides for three situations: (1) Where the goods are so affixed
to realty as to become a part thereof and not to be severable with-
out material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property
is void as against any person who has not assented to the reserva-
tion. Recording does not help the conditional sale. (2) Where
the goods are so affixed to realty as to become a part thereof, but
severable without material injury to the freehold, the reservation
of property is void as against subsequent bona fide purchasers of
the realty unless the conditional sale contract is fied as a realty
record. (3) Where a contractor affixes goods to the realty of
another, the latter is protected as against the conditional seller
unless the contract is filed as a realty record before the goods are
affixed.
Professor Bogert who drafted the Act indicates that its purpose
was to require filing of the conditional sales contract as a realty
record, where the article annexed became a part of the realty
under the law of fixtures.3 3 If such is the case, this undoubtedly
will lead to confusion in states which have different rules for de-
termining the question as to what constitutes a fixture. For ex-
ample, in the State of Washington,3 4 where it is generally consid-
ered that personalty is not a fixture, if the personalty is such
that it can be removed without material injury to the realty, the
implication is that if it could not be, it would be a fixture, and
accordingly the Act would exclude filing for record. However,
3 113 A. L. R. 484; 73 A. L. ,. 742, 743, 748; 88 A. L. R. 1344; 111 A. L. R.
378; Abramson v. Penn. & Co., 156 Md. 186, 143 Atl. 795 (1928).
22U. L. A. Vol. 2, Conditional Sales 1936 Supplement, pp. 7, 70.
"13 CoRNELL L. Q. 435, 437.
3'See n. 22 supra, 1 Ohio St. 511, 526.
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it is to be assumed that the different jurisdictions will follow
prior constructions of the Act in order to secure uniformity, this
being required in the Act. It is submitted that the real test in
such cases should be: (1) If the property has become so submerged
or identified with the realty that the property could not be removed
except with material injury, the third party is justified in be-
lieving and relying on the property as being permanently at-
tached. Filing will be of no avail. (2) If the property is of such
a character and attached in such a manner that from custom and
usage the third party may be in doubt as to whether the property
may be severed, filing should be provided for notice to third
parties. (3) If the personalty would customarily not be regarded
as a fixture, filing should not be necessary so far as third party
purchasers or encumbrancers of the real estate are concerned.35
This leads then to the consideration of our legislative provision
in 1933. An examination of the conditional sale statutes in the
various states discloses but one statute similar to the provisions
of our statute. In 1904 a statute was adopted in New York. 8
This statute provided that "every such contract for the conditional
sale of any goods or chattels attached, or to be attached, to a
building, shall be void as to subsequent bona fide purchasers or
encumbrancers of the premises on which said building stands and
as to them the sale shall be deemed absolute unless the contract
shall have been duly filed." Obviously the question at once arises,
what is meant by the words, "Attached or to be attached"? The
New York Court held that the statute was intended to apply to
those articles only where attached in such manner as to become
fixtures using the old criteria for fixtures-annexation, adaptabil-
ity, and intent." The act has, however, been superseded in New
York in 1922 by the adoption of the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act, the test in Section 7 being thereafter applied. It has been felt
that the adoption of the uniform act did not really change the con-
struction which had been made of the former act.3 8
It will be observed, however, that our act contains the additional
words "whether a fixture at common law or not." This then pre-
sents the problem as to what construction shall be made of our
act, for no doubt judicial construction will be required of the
words, "attached or to be attached, whether or not a fixture."
It is hardly reasonable to presume that our court will hold that
this section was intended to apply to any and all personalty, no
matter how attached, particularly where by custom and usage
"An excellent discussion of this question will be found in 4 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 177. See also 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 560 at page 582, where It is
said: "The test amounts to this: what would an ordinary buyer, mort-
gagee, or judgment creditor reasonably expect to be a part of property
to be sold, mortgaged or levied upon? Attachment to realty is the pre-
requisite, dedication to the service of the realty by the owner of all is
the rational basis of the rule."
"New York Laws 1904, Chap. 698, § 912; New York Laws 1909, Chap.
45, 62, The Personal Property Law.
3Kirk v. Crystal, 118 App. Div. 32, 103 N. Y. S. 17 (1907), aff. In
193 N. Y. 622, 86 N. E. 1126 (1908); also see discussion 14 CORN. L. Q. 334
et seq.
"See n. 37 supra, 14 CoRx. L. Q. 334 et seq.
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removal is contemplated. On the other hand, if it does not so
hold, there will still be a zone of uncertainty where the vendor
can not protect himself except by recording, and if he does not
record, the third party purchaser or encumbrancer will in turn
be in doubt. Perhaps the test should be that in any case where
there is a reasonable doubt from an objective standpoint based
upon usage, custom, the nature of the article, and the attendant
circumstances, as to whether or not the personalty is permanently
attached, it should make no difference that the personalty can be
removed without material injury to the property and such con-
ditional sales should be recorded as well as filed. This seems the
reasonable construction.
It is also reasonable to assume that our court will construe the
recording act to be unavailable to protect the' vendor where the
personalty has become identified with the realty. This again
will require construction through case law by the court as to the
border line cases. Again it is to be noted that the act applies
to personal property attached to a building. The question arises,
what about personalty attached directly to the real estate and so
attached that because of attendant circumstances, it cannot be re-
moved without material injury to the real estate. And further,
an exception is made to the provision requiring recording, namely,
"material, apparatus, or equipment to be used for manufacture
or industrial purposes." What personalty comes within this ex-
ception will also require judicial construction.
It is to be expected that in legislation respecting fixtures com-
bined with recording and filing acts, both of which present com-
plicated questions and conflicting policies, that there must be much
experiment before such legislation will be satisfactory. It would
seem, however, that in view of the study and care used in drafting
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, particularly with the experi-
ence and the decisions in the jurisdictions adopting same, and the
provision for uniform construction, that we might better in our
pioneering stage have used that act as our model. The present act
will, until case decision determines its application, render uncer-
tain both as to the vendor and the purchaser or encumbrancer
what conditional sales of personal contracts must be recorded as
against the real estate. It is true that if the vendor feels uncer-
tain, he may pay the additional fee for recording his contract, but
such fees are burdensome and tend to burden full and free aliena-
tion of personal property. Legislation at its best is merely an
experiment and should supersede the common or case law only
after the most cautious, studied and painstaking consideration.
LFsnm J. AYE.
